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Abstract 
 
This thesis has two parts, one consisting of three independent papers in epistemology (Chapters 1-3) 
and another one consisting of a single paper in evolutionary game theory (Chapter 4): 
 
(1) “Knowing who speaks when: A note on communication, common knowledge and 
consensus” (together with Mark Voorneveld) 
 
We study a model of pairwise communication in a finite population of Bayesian agents. We show 
that, if the individuals update only according to the signal they actually hear, and they do not take 
into account all the hypothetical signals they could have received, a consensus is not necessarily 
reached. We show that a consensus is achieved for a class of protocols satisfying “information 
exchange”: if agent A talks to agent B infinitely often, agent B also gets infinitely many 
opportunities to talk back. Finally, we show that a commonly known consensus is reached in 
arbitrary protocols, if the communication structure is commonly known. 
 
(2) “Aggregate information, common knowledge and agreeing not to bet” 
 
I consider gambles that take place even if some – but not all – people agree to participate. I show 
that the bet cannot take place if it is commonly known how many individuals are willing to 
participate. 
 
(3) “Testing rationality on primitive knowledge” (together with Olivier Gossner) 
 
The main difficulty in testing negative introspection is the infinite cardinality of the set of 
propositions. We show that, under positive conditions, negative introspection holds if and only if it 
holds for primitive propositions, and is therefore easily testable. When knowledge arises from a 
semantic model, we show that, further, negative introspection on primitive propositions is 
equivalent to partitional information structures. In this case, partitional information structures are 
easily testable. 
 
(4) “The target projection dynamic” (together with Mark Voorneveld) 
 
We study a model of learning in normal form games. The dynamic is given a microeconomic 
foundation in terms of myopic optimization under control costs due to a certain status-quo bias. We 
establish a number of desirable properties of the dynamic: existence, uniqueness, and continuity of 
solution trajectories, Nash stationarity, positive correlation with payoffs, and innovation. Sufficient 
conditions are provided under which strictly dominated strategies are wiped out. Finally, some 
stability results are provided for special classes of games. 
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